Why Were German Delegates Surprised When They Read the Treaty

Opening article of the reparations section of the Treaty of Versailles

Article 231, often known as the State of war Guilt Clause, was the opening article of the reparations department of the Treaty of Versailles, which concluded the Kickoff Earth War betwixt the High german Empire and the Allied and Associated Powers. The article did not use the word "guilt" merely information technology served equally a legal basis to compel Germany to pay reparations for the war.

Article 231 was one of the most controversial points of the treaty. It specified:

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibleness of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals accept been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Deutschland and her allies."

Germans viewed this clause as a national humiliation, forcing Germany to have total responsibility for causing the war. German politicians were vocal in their opposition to the article in an attempt to generate international sympathy, while German historians worked to undermine the article with the objective of subverting the entire treaty. The Centrolineal leaders were surprised at the High german reaction; they saw the article but equally a necessary legal basis to extract bounty from Germany. The article, with the signatory's name changed, was as well included in the treaties signed by Germany's allies who did not view the clause with the aforementioned disdain as the Germans did. American diplomat John Foster Dulles—one of the ii authors of the article—afterwards regretted the wording used, believing it further aggravated the German people.

The historical consensus is that responsibleness or guilt for the state of war was not attached to the article. Rather, the clause was a prerequisite to allow a legal basis to exist laid out for the reparation payments that were to exist made. Historians have also highlighted the unintended damage created by the clause, which caused acrimony and resentment amongst the German population.

Background [edit]

Avocourt, 1918, one of the many destroyed French villages, candidates for reconstruction funded past reparations

On 28 June 1914 the Bosnian-Serb Gavrilo Princip assassinated the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in the proper name of Serbian nationalism.^[1] This caused a diplomatic crisis, resulting in Austro-hungarian empire declaring war on Serbia and sparking the First Globe War.^[ii] Due to a variety of reasons, within weeks the major powers of Europe—divided into ii alliances known as the Central Powers and the Triple Entente—went to war. Every bit the conflict progressed, additional countries from around the earth became drawn into the conflict on both sides.^[3]

Fighting would rage across Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia for the next four years.^[4] On 8 Jan 1918, U.s. President Woodrow Wilson issued a statement that became known every bit the Fourteen Points. In part, this speech chosen for the Cardinal Powers to withdraw from the territories they had occupied, for the creation of a Polish state, the redrawing of Europe's borders along ethnic ("national") lines, and the formation of a League of Nations.^{[5] [6]} During the northern-hemisphere fall of 1918, the Central Powers began to collapse.^[7] The German military suffered a decisive defeat on the Western Forepart, while on the Dwelling house Front the Regal German Navy mutinied, prompting uprisings in Federal republic of germany which became known equally the German Revolution.^{[eight] [9] [10]} The High german government attempted to obtain a peace settlement based on the Fourteen Points, and maintained it was on this basis that Germany surrendered. Following negotiations, the Allied Powers and Deutschland signed an armistice, which came into effect on 11 November while German language forces were still positioned in France and Belgium.^{[11] [12] [13]}

On eighteen January 1919 the Paris Peace Briefing began. The conference aimed to constitute peace between the war'due south belligerents and to found the post-war world. The Treaty of Versailles resulting from the conference dealt solely with Germany.^{[fourteen] [15]} This treaty, along with the others that were signed during the conference, each took their proper name from the suburb of Paris where the signings took place.^[16] While 70 delegates from 26 nations participated in the Paris negotiations, representatives from Germany were barred from attention, nominally over fears that a German delegation would endeavor to play one country off confronting the other and unfairly influence the proceedings.^{[16] [17]}

Writing of the article [edit]

The Americans, British and French all differed on the upshot of reparations settlement. The Western Front had been fought in France, and that countryside had been heavily scarred in the fighting. French republic's near industrialized region in the n-eastward had been laid to waste during the High german retreat. Hundreds of mines and factories were destroyed along with railroads, bridges and villages. Georges Clemenceau, the Prime number Government minister of France, idea it advisable that any only peace required Frg to pay reparations for the impairment they had caused. He as well saw reparations as a ways to ensure that Germany could not once more threaten France and as well to weaken the German language ability to compete with France's industrialization.^[18] Reparations would besides get towards the reconstruction costs in other countries, such equally Belgium, besides directly afflicted by the state of war.^[19] British Prime number Government minister David Lloyd George opposed harsh reparations in favour of a less crippling reparations settlement so that the German economic system could remain a viable economic power and British trading partner. He furthermore argued that reparations should include war pensions for disabled veterans and allowances to be paid to war widows, which would reserve a larger share of the reparations for the British Empire.^{[20] [21] [22]} Wilson opposed these positions, and was adamant that at that place be no indemnity imposed upon Federal republic of germany.^[23]

During the peace briefing the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties^[a] was established to examine the background of the war. The Commission reasoned that the "state of war was premeditated by the Fundamental Powers ... and was the result of acts deliberately committed [by them] to get in unavoidable", concluding that Germany and Austria-Hungary had "deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war." This determination was duly incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles,^[31] led by Clemenceau and Lloyd George who were both insistent on the inclusion of an unequivocal statement of Deutschland's full liability.^[32] This left Wilson at odds with the other leaders of the briefing. Instead, he proposed a repetition of a annotation sent past United States Secretary of Country Robert Lansing to the German language Government on 5 November 1918, stating that the "Allied Governments ... understand that compensation volition be made past Frg for all damage washed to the civilian population of the Allies and their belongings by the aggression of Germany ..."^{[23] [32]}

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Deutschland accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals accept been subjected as a issue of the war imposed upon them by the assailment of Germany and her allies."

– Commodity 231^[33]

The actual diction of the article was chosen by American diplomats Norman Davis and John Foster Dulles.^[34] Davis and Dulles produced a compromise between the Anglo-French and American positions, wording Article 231 and 232 to reflect that Germany "should, morally, pay for all state of war costs, but, considering it could not possibly beget this, would be asked only to pay for civilian damages."^[23] Article 231, in which Frg accepted the responsibility of Germany and its allies for the damages resulting from the First World War, therefore served every bit a legal basis for the manufactures following it inside the reparations chapter, obliging Deutschland to pay bounty express to civilian damages.^[35] Like clauses, with slight modification in diction, were present in the peace treaties signed by the other members of the Fundamental Powers.^[b]

Reaction [edit]

German language interpretation [edit]

Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau

Foreign Minister Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau headed the 180-potent German peace delegation. They departed Berlin on 18 April 1919, anticipating that the peace talks would soon start and that they and the Allied Powers would negotiate a settlement. Earlier, in February of that yr, Brockdorff-Rantzau had informed the Weimar National Associates that Frg would have to pay reparations for the destruction acquired by the war, but would not pay for bodily state of war costs.^[twoscore] The German government had also taken the position that it would be "inadvisable ... to elevate the question of war guilt".^[41] On v May, Brockdorff-Rantzau was informed that there would be no negotiations. One time the German delegation received the conditions of peace they would have fifteen days to respond. Following the drafting of the treaty, on 7 May the German and Centrolineal delegations met and the Treaty of Versailles was handed off to be translated and for a response to be issued. At this meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau stated that "We know the intensity of the hatred which meets us, and we have heard the victors' passionate demand that equally the vanquished nosotros shall exist fabricated to pay, and every bit the guilty we shall be punished". However, he proceeded to deny that Germany was solely responsible for the state of war. Following the meeting, the German delegation retired to translate the 80,000 word document. Every bit soon as the delegation realized the terms of peace, they agreed that they could not have it without revision. They and so proceeded to send their Allied counterparts, bulletin later on message attacking each function of the treaty.^[42] On 18 June, having disregarded the repeated explicit decisions of the government, Brockdorff-Rantzau declared that Article 231 would have Germany accept full responsibility for the state of war past force.^{[41] [43] [44]} Max Weber, an counselor with the German delegation, agreed with Brockdorff-Rantzau, as well challenging the Allies over the issue of state of war guilt. He preferred to turn down the treaty than submit to what he called a "rotten peace".^[45]

On 16 June, the Allied Powers demanded that Germany unconditionally sign the treaty inside 7 days or face up the resumption of hostilities. The German government was divided on whether to sign or reject the peace treaty. On 19 June, Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann resigned rather than sign the treaty and was followed by Brockdorff-Rantzau and other members of the government, leaving Germany without a chiffonier or peace delegation. After being advised by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg that Germany was in no status to resume the war, President Friedrich Ebert and the new Chancellor, Gustav Bauer, recommended that the Weimar National Associates ratify the treaty. The Assembly did and then past a large majority, and Clemenceau was informed nineteen minutes before the deadline expired. Frg unconditionally signed the peace treaty on 22 June.^{[46] [47]}

Initially, Article 231 was not correctly translated. Rather than stating "... Germany accepts responsibility of Deutschland and her allies causing all the loss and harm ...", the High german Government's edition read "Frg admits it, that Germany and her allies, as authors of the war, are responsible for all losses and damages ...".^[48] Germans felt that they the land had signed away her honor, and there was a prevailing conventionalities of humiliation every bit the commodity was seen, overall, as an injustice.^{[45] [49]} Historian Wolfgang Mommsen commented that despite the public outrage, German authorities officials were aware "that Germany'southward position on this matter was not near so favorable as the purple government had led the German public to believe during the war."^[41]

Centrolineal stance on commodity [edit]

The Allied delegation initially thought Commodity 231 to be a mundane addition to the treaty intended to limit German liability with regard to reparations, and were surprised at the vehemence of the High german protests.^[50] Georges Clemenceau rebuffed Brockdorff-Rantzau's allegations, arguing that "the legal estimation [of the article] was the correct one" and not a matter of political question.^[43] Lloyd George commented that "the English public, like the French public, thinks the Germans must above all acknowledge their obligation to compensate us for all the consequences of their aggression. When this is done nosotros come to the question of Germany's capacity to pay; we all think she will be unable to pay more this document requires of her."^[fifty]

Prior to the American entry into the state of war, Woodrow Wilson chosen for a "peace of reconciliation with Germany", what he dubbed a "peace without victory". His wartime speeches, nevertheless, rejected these earlier notions and he took an increasingly belligerent stance towards Germany.^[51] Following the state of war, on 4 September 1919, during his public campaign to rally American back up for the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson commented that the treaty "seeks to punish 1 of the greatest wrongs ever done in history, the incorrect which Deutschland sought to practise to the world and to civilization, and there ought to be no weak purpose with regard to the application of the punishment. She attempted an intolerable affair, and she must be made to pay for the attempt."^[52] Regardless of the rhetoric, the American position was to create a balanced treaty that would appease anybody. Gordon Auchincloss, secretary to Edward M. Firm (one of Wilson's advisers), sent a copy of the clause to the State Department and stated "you will note that the President'southward principles have been protected in this clause".^[53]

Historian William Keylor commented that initially both United states diplomats believed that they had "devised a brilliant solution to the reparation dilemma"; appeasing both the British and French, also as Allied public opinion irrespective of the fact that Allied leaders were enlightened of concerns surrounding High german willingness to pay reparations and the disappointment that could follow.^[53] Vance C. McCormick (an economic adviser of Wilson) emphasized this point, and stated: "...the preamble is useful. We are adopting an unusual method in not fixing a definite sum. The preamble tends to explain this, and further, prepares the public mind for disappointment as to what really can be secured."^[54] In 1940, Dulles stated that he was surprised that the commodity "could plausibly exist, and in fact was, considered to be a historical sentence of war guilt". He further noted that the "profound significance of this article ... came well-nigh through accident, rather than design".^[55] Dulles took it personally that the Treaty of Versailles failed in its intentions of creating a lasting peace and believed that the treaty was one of the causes of the 2nd World War. Past 1954, as United States Secretary of State and in discussion with the Soviet Union in regards to High german reunification, he commented that "Efforts to bankrupt and humiliate a nation only incite a people of vigor and of courage to break the bonds imposed upon them. ... Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited."^[56]

Impact [edit]

Reparations [edit]

Trains, loaded with machinery, deliver their cargo every bit reparation payment in kind.

Bounty demanded from the defeated party was a common feature of peace treaties.^[57] The financial burden of the Treaty of Versailles was labelled "reparations", which distinguished them from punitive settlements unremarkably known as indemnities. The reparations were intended for reconstruction and as compensation for families who had been bereaved by the war.^[19] Emerge Marks wrote that the article "was designed to lay a legal ground for reparations" to be paid. Commodity 231 "established an unlimited theoretical liability" for which Deutschland would have to pay merely the following article "in fact narrowed German responsibility to civilian amercement".^{[35] [c]} When the last reparation figure was established in 1921, information technology was based on an Centrolineal assessment of [the] German language capacity to pay, not on the footing of Centrolineal claims.^[35]

The London Schedule of Payments, of 5 May 1921, established the total liability of the combined Fundamental Powers at 132 billion gold marks. Of this figure, Germany was only required to pay 50 billion gilded marks ($12.5 billion), a smaller amount than they had previously offered for terms of peace.^[59] Reparations were unpopular and strained the High german economy but they were payable and from 1919 to 1931, when reparations ended, Germany paid fewer than 21 billion gilded marks.^[sixty] The Reparation Commission and the Bank for International Settlements gave a total German payment of 20.598 billion gold marks, whereas historian Niall Ferguson estimated that Germany paid no more than 19 billion gold marks.^{[61] [62]} Ferguson also wrote that this sum was but 2.4 per cent of German national income betwixt 1919 and 1932, while Stephen Schuker places the figure at an average of 2 per cent of national income between 1919 and 1931, in greenbacks and kind, making a total transfer equal to 5.3 per cent of national income for the period.^{[62] [63]} Gerhard Weinberg wrote that reparations were paid, towns were rebuilt, orchards replanted, mines reopened and pensions paid just the burden of repairs was shifted from the German economy to the damaged economies of the victors.^[64]

Effects on German political opinion and revisionism [edit]

Domestic German opposition to Article 231 has been held to have created a psychological and political burden on the post-war Weimar Republic.^{[65] [66]} German politicians seeking international sympathy would employ the article for its propaganda value, disarming many who had not read the treaties that the article implied full war guilt.^[35] German revisionist historians who afterwards attempted to ignore the validity of the clause establish a ready audience among 'revisionist' writers in France, Britain, and the U.s..^[67] The objective of both the politicians and historians was to prove that Germany was not solely guilty for causing the state of war; if that guilt could exist disproved the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.^[68] To that stop, the German language government funded the Eye for the Study of the Causes of the War. This discipline, the question of Deutschland's guilt (Kriegsschuldfrage or war guilt question) became a major theme of Adolf Hitler's political career.^[69]

Us Senator Henrik Shipstead argued that the failure to revise the commodity became a factor in Hitler'southward rise to ability.,^{[70] [71]} a view held by some historians, such as Tony Rea and John Wright, who wrote that "the harshness of the War Guilt Clause and the reparations demands made it easier for Hitler to gain power in Germany."^[72] Despite these views, the historical consensus is that the commodity and the treaty, did non cause the rise of Nazism but that an unconnected ascent in extremism and the Nifty Depression led to the NSDAP gaining greater balloter popularity and then being maneuvered into function.^{[73] [74]} The Marxist historian Fritz Klein wrote that while there was a path from Versailles to Hitler, the one-time did not make "Hitler's takeover of ability inevitable" and that "the Germans had a option when they decided to have this path. In other words, they did non have to. Hitler's victory was not an unavoidable result of Versailles."^[75]

Historical assessment [edit]

In 1926, Robert C. Binkley and A. C. Mahr of Stanford Academy, wrote that German accusations of the article assigning war guilt were "ill-founded" and "mistaken". The article was more "an supposition of liability to pay amercement than an admission of state of war guilt" and compared information technology with "a human who undertakes to pay all the cost of a motor accident than to the plea of guilty entered by an accused criminal". They wrote that "information technology is absurd" to charge the reparation manufactures of the treaty with any "political meaning" and the legal estimation "is the only i that can stand up". They concluded that German opposition "is based upon a text which has no legal validity whatsoever, and which Germany never signed at all."^[76] Sidney Fay was the "most outspoken and influential critic" of the article. In 1928, he ended that all of Europe shared the blame for the war and that Germany had no intention of launching a general European war in 1914.^[77]

In 1937, East. H. Carr commented that "in the passion of the moment" the Allied Powers had "failed to realize that this extorted admission of guilt could prove nothing, and must excite bitter resentment in German language minds." He concluded "German men of learning fix to work to demonstrate the guiltlessness of their land, fondly assertive that, if this could be established, the whole textile of the treaty would plummet."^[78] René Albrecht-Carrié wrote in May 1940, that "article 231 gave rise to an unfortunate controversy, unfortunate because information technology served to raise a fake issue." He wrote that the German language inter-state of war argument "rested on her responsibility for the out-break of the war" and if that guilt could be disproved and then the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.^[68]

In 1942, Luigi Albertini published The Origins of the State of war of 1914 and concluded that Federal republic of germany was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the war.^{[79] [eighty]} Albertini's piece of work, rather than spurring on new debate, was the culmination of the outset research stage into the war guilt question.^[81] The issue came back between 1959 and 1969, when Fritz Fischer in Federal republic of germany'southward Aims in the First Earth War and War of Illusions "destroyed the consensus about shared responsibility for the Offset World State of war" and "placed the blame ... firmly on the shoulders of the Wilhelmine aristocracy." Past the 1970s, his piece of work "had emerged as the new orthodoxy on the origins of the First World War".^[82] In the 1980s, James Joll led a new moving ridge of First Globe War inquiry concluding "that the origins of the Commencement Earth War were "circuitous and varied" although "past December 1912" Deutschland had decided to go to war.^[83]

In 1978, Marks re-examined the reparation clauses of the treaty and wrote that "the much-criticized 'war guilt clause', Article 231, which was designed to lay a legal basis for reparations, in fact makes no mention of war guilt" but but specified that Germany was to pay for the damages caused by the war they imposed upon the allies and "that Deutschland committed an act of assailment confronting Belgium is beyond dispute". "Technically, United kingdom entered" the war and French troops entered Belgium "to honor" the "legal obligation" to defend Belgium under the 1839 Treaty of London and that "Deutschland openly best-selling her responsibility in regard to Belgium on August iv, 1914, and May 7, 1919." Marks besides wrote that "the same clause, mutatis mutandis" was incorporated "in the treaties with Austria and Hungary, neither of whom interpreted it as proclamation of war guilt."^[35] Wolfgang Mommsen wrote that "Austria and Hungary, understandably paid no attention to this aspect of the draft treaty".^[41]

In 1986, Marks wrote that the German language strange role, supported past military and noncombatant notables, "focused on Article 231 ... hoping that, if one could abnegate German responsibility for the war, not simply reparations just the entire treaty would plummet".^[84] Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser wrote that "pragmatic requirements characteristically influenced the shaping of the much misunderstood Article 231. That paragraph reflected the presumed legal necessity to ascertain German responsibility for the state of war in order to specify and limit the Reich'southward obligations".^[85] P.Grand.H. Bell wrote that despite the article not using the term 'guilt', and while "it may be that its drafters did non intend to convey a moral judgement of Germany", the article has "almost universally" became known every bit the state of war guilt clause of the treaty.^[67] Margaret MacMillan wrote that the German language public'southward interpretation of Article 231 as unequivocally ascribing the error for the state of war to Federal republic of germany and her allies, "came to be the object of item loathing in Frg and the cause of uneasy consciences amongst the Allies." The Allies never expected such a hostile reaction, for "no one thought there would be any difficulty over the clauses themselves."^[fifty]

Stephen Neff wrote that "the term 'war guilt' is a slightly unfortunate one, since to lawyers, the term 'guilt' primarily connotes criminal liability" while "the responsibility of Germany envisaged in the Versailles Treaty ... was civil in nature, comparable to the indemnity obligation of classical simply-war theory."^[31] Louise Slavicek wrote that while "the article was an honest reflection of the treaty-writers' beliefs, including such a clause in the peace settlement was undiplomatic, to say the least."^[86] Diane Kunz wrote that "rather than being seen as an American lawyer's clever attempt to limit actual German fiscal responsibility by buying off French politicians and their public with the sop of a piece of paper" Article 231 "became an hands exploitable open sore".^[87] Ian Kershaw wrote that the "national disgrace" felt over the article and "defeat, revolution, and the establishment of commonwealth", had "fostered a climate in which a counter-revolutionary set of ideas could gain wide currency" and "enhanced the creation of a mood in which" extreme nationalist ideas could proceeds a wider audience and have hold.^[88]

Elazar Barkan argues that by "forcing an admission of war guilt at Versailles, rather than healing, the victors instigated resentment that contributed to the rise of Fascism."^[89] Norman Davies wrote that the article invited Germany "to accept sole guilt for the preceding war".^[90] Klaus Schwabe wrote that the article's influence went far beyond the word of state of war guilt. By "refusing to acknowledge Germany's 'war guilt' the new German government implicitly exonerated the one-time monarchial order" and more importantly failed "to dissociate itself from the erstwhile government." In doing and so "information technology undermined its claim that post-revolutionary Germany was a historic new autonomous first deserving credit at the peace conference."^[91]

Notes [edit]

Footnotes

1. ^ The commission was equanimous of sixteen members from ten countries.^[24] All were trained legal professionals.^[25] They were:
   
   • United States: United States Secretary of Land Robert Lansing too every bit international lawyer, and quondam solicitor to the U.s. Department of State, James Brown Scott.^{[26] [27]}
   • British Empire: Attorney General Gordon Hewart, Solicitor Full general Ernest Pollock, and Prime Government minister of New Zealand William Massey.^[26]
   • France: Politician André Tardieu, likewise equally the Dean of the Paris Law Faculty Ferdinand Larnaude.^{[25] [26] [28]}
   • Italian republic: Mr. Scialoja and Mr. Raimondo^[26]
   • Japan: Expert in international police force Mineichirō Adachi, and diplomat Harukazu Nagaoka.^{[26] [29]}
   • Belgium: International law scholar Edouard Rolin-Jaequemyns^{[26] [25]}
   • Greece: Greek Foreign Minister and scholar of international police force Nicolas Politis^{[26] [25]}
   • Poland: Constantin Skirmunt^[26]
   • Romania: Jurist S. Rosental^[thirty]
   • Serbia: Chief international police force proficient to the Serbian peace delegation and Rector of the Academy of Belgrade Slobodan Jovanović^{[30] [27]}
2. ^ Article 117 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye: "... Austria accepts the responsibility of Austria and her Allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals take been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them past the assailment of Republic of austria-Republic of hungary and her Allies".^[36] Commodity 161 of the Treaty of Trianon: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Hungary accepts the responsibility of Hungary and her allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals take been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Republic of austria-Republic of hungary and her allies."^[37] Article 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine: "Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of assailment which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Centrolineal and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make complete reparation".^[38] Article 231 of the Treaty of Sevres: "Turkey recognises that past joining in the war of aggression which Frg and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied Powers she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds for which she ought to make complete reparation."^[39]
3. ^ "The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate ... to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.
   The Allied and Associated Governments, withal, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make bounty for all damage washed to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency ..."^[58]

Citations

1. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. xxv and nine.
2. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 1078.
3. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. eleven–thirteen.
4. ^ Simkins, Jukes & Hickey 2003, p. nine.
5. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 429.
6. ^ Fourteen Points Speech
7. ^ Beller 2007, pp. 182–95.
8. ^ Simkins 2002, p. 71.
9. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 638.
10. ^ Schmitt 1960, p. 101.
11. ^ Schmitt 1960, p. 102.
12. ^ Weinberg 1994, p. 8.
13. ^ Boyer et al. 2009, p. 526.
14. ^ Slavicek 2010, pp. 8 and 37.
15. ^ Osmańczyk 2003, p. 1898.
16. ^ ^{a b} Schmitt 1960, p. 103.
17. ^ Phillips 2007, p. 152.
18. ^ Slavicek 2010, pp. 41–3 and 58.
19. ^ ^{a b} Weinberg 1994, p. 14.
20. ^ Slavicek 2010, p. 44.
21. ^ Brezina 2006, p. 21.
22. ^ Yearwood 2009, p. 127.
23. ^ ^{a b c} Martel 2010, p. 272.
24. ^ United states Department of State 1919, pp. 204–v.
25. ^ ^{a b c d} Lewis 2014, p. 42.
26. ^ ^{a b c d due east f g h} United States Department of State 1919, p. 204.
27. ^ ^{a b} Lewis 2014, p. 43.
28. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 1159.
29. ^ Fassbender & Peters 2012, p. 740.
30. ^ ^{a b} Us Department of State 1919, p. 205.
31. ^ ^{a b} Neff 2005, p. 289.
32. ^ ^{a b} Steiner 2005, p. 59.
33. ^ Treaty of Versailles, Article 231
34. ^ Immerman 1998, pp. viii–10.
35. ^ ^{a b c d e} Marks 1978, pp. 231–232.
36. ^ Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Article 177
37. ^ Treaty of Trianon, Article 161
38. ^ Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Article 121
39. ^ Treaty of Sèvres, Article 231
40. ^ Young 2006, pp. 133–135.
41. ^ ^{a b c d} Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, pp. 537–538.
42. ^ Immature 2006, pp. 135–136.
43. ^ ^{a b} Binkley & Mahr 1926, p. 399.
44. ^ Craig & Gilbert 1994, p. 141.
45. ^ ^{a b} Morrow 2005, p. 290.
46. ^ Shirer 1990, p. 59.
47. ^ Young 2006, pp. 136–137.
48. ^ Binkley & Mahr 1926, pp. 399–400.
49. ^ Binkley & Mahr 1926, p. 400.
50. ^ ^{a b c} MacMillan & Holbrooke 2003, p. 193.
51. ^ Trachtenberg 1982, pp. 490–491.
52. ^ Trachtenberg 1982, p. 491.
53. ^ ^{a b} Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 500.
54. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, pp. 500–501.
55. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 501.
56. ^ Immerman 1998, p. 10.
57. ^ Bong 1986, p. 22.
58. ^ Treaty of Versailles, Commodity 232
59. ^ Marks 1978, p. 237.
60. ^ Bell 1986, p. 38.
61. ^ Marks 1978, pp. 233 and 237.
62. ^ ^{a b} Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 424.
63. ^ Martel 1999, p. 43.
64. ^ Weinberg 1994, p. sixteen.
65. ^ Soumerai & Schulz 1998, p. 17.
66. ^ Bendersky 1984, p. 10.
67. ^ ^{a b} Bong 1986, p. 21.
68. ^ ^{a b} Albrecht-Carrié 1940, p. xv.
69. ^ Thomsett 2007, p. xiii.
70. ^ Henig 1995, p. 52.
71. ^ Stuhler 1973, p. 92.
72. ^ Rea & Wright 1997, p. 39.
73. ^ Slavicek 2010, p. 94.
74. ^ Evans 1989, p. 107.
75. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 220.
76. ^ Binkley & Mahr 1926, pp. 398–400.
77. ^ Slavicek 2010, pp. 19–20.
78. ^ Welch 1995, p. 271.
79. ^ Lafore 1997, p. 21.
80. ^ Mombauer 2002, pp. 125 and 166.
81. ^ Stevenson 1996, p. 410.
82. ^ Mulligan 2010, pp. 11–12.
83. ^ Mulligan 2010, p. 14.
84. ^ Martel 1999, p. 19.
85. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. sixteen.
86. ^ Slavicek 2010, p. 57.
87. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 524.
88. ^ Kershaw 2000, pp. 136–137.
89. ^ Barkan 2000, p. xxiii.
90. ^ Davies 2007, p. 133.
91. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 48.

References [edit]

Books

• Barkan, Elazar (2000) [1999]. The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. New York: Due west. West. Norton. ISBN978-0-393-04886-5.
• Bell, P.M.H. (1986). The Origins of the Second World State of war in Europe (2nd 1997 ed.). London: Pearson. ISBN978-0-582-30470-iii.
• Bendersky, Joseph W. (1984). A History of Nazi Federal republic of germany: 1919–1945 (2nd 2000 ed.). Chicago: Burnham. ISBN978-0-830-41567-0.
• Beller, Steven (2007). A Concise History of Republic of austria . Cambridge Curtailed Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing. ISBN978-0-521-47886-1.
• Boemeke, Manfred F.; Feldman, Gerald D. & Glaser, Elisabeth, eds. (1998). Versailles: A Reassessment subsequently 75 Years. Publications of the High german Historical Plant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-62132-8.
• Boyer, Paul Southward.; Clark, Clifford Due east.; Hawley, Sandra; Kett, Joseph F. & Rieser, Andrew (2009). From 1865. The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People. Vol. two. Boston MA: Cengage Learning. ISBN978-0-547-22278-3.
• Brezina, Corona (2006). The Treaty of Versailles, 1919: A Primary Source Examination of the Treaty That Ended World War I. Primary Sources of American Treaties. New York: Rosen Fundamental. ISBN978-one-404-20442-3.
• Craig, Gordon Alexander & Gilbert, Felix, eds. (1994) [1953]. The Diplomats 1919–1939. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN978-0-691-03660-1.
• Davies, Norman (2007). Europe at War 1939–1945: No Elementary Victory. London: Pan Books. ISBN978-0-330-35212-iii.
• Evans, Richard J. (1989). In Hitler's Shadow (1st ed.). New York: Pantheon. ISBN978-067972-348-6.
• Fassbender, Bardo & Peters, Anne, eds. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Constabulary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-199-59975-2.
• Henig, Ruth (1995) [1984]. Versailles and Later on: 1919–1933. Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-12710-3.
• Immerman, Richard H. (1998). John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Ability in U.Southward. Foreign Policy. Biographies in American Foreign Policy. Vol. 2. Lanham Md: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN978-0-842-02601-7.
• Kershaw, Ian (2000) [1998]. Hitler: 1889–1936 Hubris. New York: W. W. Norton. ISBN978-0-393-32035-0.
• Lafore, Laurence (1997). The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of Globe War I (second ed.). Long Grove IL: Waveland Pr Inc. ISBN978-0-88133-954-iii.
• Lewis, Mark (2014). The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Offense and Punishment, 1919–1950. Oxford Studies in Modern European History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-199-66028-5.
• MacMillan, Margaret; Holbrooke, Richard (2003). Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. New York: Random House. ISBN978-0-375-76052-five.
• Martel, Gordon, ed. (1999). Origins of the 2d Globe War Reconsidered (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-16325-five.
• Martel, Gordon, ed. (2010). A Companion to Europe 1900–1945. Hoboken NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN978-1-444-33840-9.
• Mombauer, Annika (2002). The Origins of the Commencement Earth War: Controversies and Consensus. London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-582-41872-i.
• Morrow, John H. (2005). The Great War: An Regal History. London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-20440-eight.
• Mulligan, William (2010). Origins of the Commencement Globe War. New Approaches to European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing. ISBN978-0-521-71394-8.
• Neff, Stephen C. (2005). War and the Law of Nations: A General History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-66205-v.
• Phillips, David J. (2007). On This Day. Vol. 1. Bloomington IN: iUniverse. ISBN978-0-595-46288-ix.
• Rea, Tony & Wright, John (1997). International Relations 1914–1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-199-17167-5.
• Shirer, William (1990). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon & Schuster; 1st Touchstone editio. ISBN978-0-671-72868-7.
• Simkins, Peter; Jukes, Geoffrey & Hickey, Michael (2003). The First Globe State of war: The War to Finish All Wars. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-one-841-76738-3.
• Simkins, Peter (2002). The Western Front 1917–1918. The First Globe War. Vol. 3. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1-841-76348-4.
• Slavicek, Louise Chipley (2010). The Treaty of Versailles. Milestones in Modern World History. New York: Chelsea House Publications. ISBN978-one-604-13277-9.
• Soumerai, Eve Nussbaum & Schulz, Carol D. (1998). Daily Life During the Holocaust. Daily Life Through History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Printing. ISBN978-0-313-30202-2.
• Steiner, Zara (2005). The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933. Oxford History of Modern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN978-0-198-22114-2.
• Stevenson, David (1996). Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914. New York: Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN978-0-198-20208-0.
• Stuhler, Barbara (1973). Ten Men of Minnesota and American Strange Policy. St Paul: Minnesota Historical Social club Printing. ISBN978-0-873-51080-6.
• Thomsett, Michael C. (2007). The German Opposition to Hitler: The Resistance, the Underground, and Assassination Plots, 1938–1945. Jefferson NC: McFarland. ISBN978-0-7864-3027-7.
• United states Section of Country (1919). "Papers relating to the foreign relations of the U.s., The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 Volume III". Foreign Relations of the United States. United States Government Printing Office.
• Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1994). A World at Artillery: A Global History of World State of war II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN0-521-44317-2.
• Welch, David A. (1995). Justice and the Genesis of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Book 29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing. ISBN978-0-521-55868-vi.
• Yearwood, Peter J. (2009). Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy 1914–1925. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-199-22673-3.
• Immature, William (2006). German Diplomatic Relations 1871–1945: The Wilhelmstrasse and the Formulation of Strange Policy. Bloomington IN: iUniverse, Inc. ISBN978-0-595-40706-4.

Encyclopedias

• Osmańczyk, Edmund January (2003). Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. Vol. i (third ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-93921-8.
• Tucker, Spencer C. & Roberts, Priscilla (2005). The Encyclopedia of Globe State of war I : A Political, Social, and Armed forces History. Santa Barbara CA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN978-i-85109-420-2.

Journals

• Albrecht-Carrié, René (March 1940). "Versailles 20 Years Afterwards". Political Science Quarterly. New York: The Academy of Political Science. 55 (1): i–24. doi:10.2307/2143772. ISSN 0032-3195. JSTOR 2143772.
• Binkley, Robert C.; Mahr, Dr. A. C. (June 1926). "A New Interpretation of the "Responsibility" Clause in the Versailles Treaty". Current History (Periodicals Archive Online ed.). New York: New York Times. 24 (iii): 398–400. OCLC 1589080.
• Marks, Sally (September 1978). "The Myths of Reparations". Central European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xi (3): 231–255. doi:ten.1017/s0008938900018707. ISSN 1569-1616. JSTOR 4545835. OCLC 47795498.
• Schmitt, Bernadotte (Feb 1960). "The Peace Treaties of 1919–1920". Proceedings of the American Philosophical Guild. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society. 104 (1): 101–110. ISSN 0003-049X. JSTOR 985606.
• Trachtenberg, Marc (July 1982). "Versailles later Sixty Years". Journal of Contemporary History. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications. 17 (3): 487–506. doi:10.1177/002200948201700305. ISSN 0022-0094. JSTOR 260557. OCLC 1783199. S2CID 154283533.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles

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